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Abstract
In an ideal world, funding agencies could identify the best scientists and projects and 
provide them with the resources to undertake these projects. Most scientists would 
agree that in practice, how funding for scientific research is allocated is far from 
ideal and likely compromises research quality. We, nine evolutionary biologists from 
different countries and career stages, provide a comparative summary of our impres‐
sions on funding strategies for evolutionary biology across eleven different funding 
agencies. We also assess whether and how funding effectiveness might be improved. 
We focused this assessment on 14 elements within four broad categories: (a) topical 
shaping of science, (b) distribution of funds, (c) application and review procedures, 
and (d) incentives for mobility and diversity. These comparisons revealed striking 
among‐country variation in those elements, including wide variation in funding rates, 
the effort and burden required for grant applications, and the extent of emphasis 
on societal relevance and individual mobility. We use these observations to provide 
constructive suggestions for the future and urge the need to further gather informed 
considerations from scientists on the effects of funding policies on science across 
countries and research fields.
K E Y W O R D S
funding, funding rate, grant proposal, science policy, scientific quality
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1  | FUNDING CRISIS:  WHAT ARE THE 
CRITIC AL CHALLENGES AND HOW C AN 
THESE CHALLENGES BE ADDRESSED?
Scientific funding agencies would ideally be able to select excellent 
scientists and research projects and provide these scientists with 
sufficient resources to undertake the best possible work. Indeed, 
these goals should constitute the ultimate aspiration of any funding 
programme. Many countries recognize that investment in scientific 
research is central to economic and societal advances, manifested 
as substantial government investment of GDP in science (OECD, 
2018; Stephan, 2012). Nevertheless, because financial limitations 
often impose severe constraints on the ability of funding agencies to 
support excellent scientists and their ideas, deeper understanding 
of how to allocate funding most effectively is of critical importance.
It is obvious that finite funding supply can prevent the execution 
of at least some excellent research. There are additional negative 
consequences of the imbalance between the intellectual capac‐
ity of the scientific community and available resources (see also, 
e.g., Stephan, 2012; Alberts, Kirschner, Tilghman, & Varmus, 2014; 
Franssen, Scholten, Hessels, & de Rijcke, 2018; Whitley, Gläser, & 
Laudel, 2018). For example, the high workload connected to the 
need to submit many grant proposals to achieve funding success 
can in turn generate high stress levels, increasing despondency, 
frustration and lack of motivation. These issues can be exacerbated 
for junior scientists, whose careers often depend on the acquisition 
of external funding prior to gaining a permanent faculty position 
(Powell, 2016). Proposal reviewing and administrative burdens also 
tend to be heavier when funding is limited, with researchers often 
forced to submit more applications as funding rates decrease. A fur‐
ther decrease in funding rates will result from this negative cycle. 
Intense competition for funding can also generate downstream neg‐
ative consequences ranging from the abandonment of promising 
but risky ideas in favour of more “fundable” projects (Fochler, Felt, 
& Müller, 2016; Laudel, 2006; Powell, 2016; Stephan, 2012) to the 
incentivization of questionable research practices and even fraudu‐
lent behaviour (Moore, Neylon, Eve, O'Donnell, & Pattinson, 2017; 
Tijdink et al., 2016).
In our opinion, low funding rates underlie a transition from 
“eustress,” the positive stress state associated with healthy fair 
competition for limited resources, to “distress,” the negative de‐
structive stress state, in many countries. Eustress in this context 
can arise because some degree of fair competition can help gen‐
erate motivation, and because regular and clear statements and 
peer evaluation of research goals and project plans help to main‐
tain and increase scientific quality. Distress can be generated when 
resource restriction is so severe that the funding system becomes 
dysfunctional and impedes rather than promotes scientific qual‐
ity and progress. Our evaluation suggests that this distress state 
now characterizes the scientific community in multiple countries, 
culminating in waste of precious available resources and failure to 
maximize the potential for rapid scientific progress (see also, e.g., 
Alberts et al., 2014).
In our view, the consequences of severe funding limitation extend 
beyond the applicants (see also Stephan, 2012). First, administration 
of the applications uses a substantial fraction of available resources 
(see also Vaesen & Katzav, 2017). Second, peer reviewers and com‐
mittee members might feel that they can no longer make a useful 
contribution, leading to a “distress” state involving substantial waste 
of time, effort and financial resources linked to a lengthy process of 
application, review and re‐review before worthy projects are funded. 
Although grant writing can be helpful when causing "eustress", as it 
makes researchers think about the next research question and how to 
approach it, in a "distress" state it resembles a Tragedy of the Commons 
with respect to time, the most limited resource of all: scientists devote 
weeks or months to grant writing and reviewing instead of conducting 
research, providing direct constructive feedback to peers, teaching, 
engaging publicly or advising the government.
In addition, multiple lines of evidence suggest that the ideal‐
ized goals of competitive research funding systems are often unmet 
(OECD, 2018). Funding agencies are aware that no individual or 
panel possesses an inerrant ability to objectively assess “quality” or 
“potential,” and judgements are never totally aligned among all panel 
members (see also Abrams, 1991). Of course, panels do in principle 
aim to reach the best decisions during what is necessarily a complex 
and multi‐faceted evaluation process (Lamont, 2009). In our experi‐
ence, effective panels will, for example, allocate much of their time to 
discussing applicants/applications whose initial rankings vary among 
panel members. Ultimately, however, the reality that all final deci‐
sions will reflect some subjectivity has been demonstrated by multiple 
studies (e.g., Cousens, 2019; Li & Agha, 2015; OECD, 2018; Wilsdon 
et al., 2015; Winder & Hodge, 2017). Subjectivity in peer review can 
therefore be considered an unavoidable limitation of any competitive 
funding system and will likely mean that there is often no difference 
in “quality” between research that has received funding and “the next 
best” (i.e., nearly funded) research (van den Besselar & Sandström, 
2015). This situation might also often reflect resource limitation that 
results in research proposals that are evaluated by reviewers as of 
very high or outstanding quality but that nevertheless go unfunded. 
Despite its shortcomings, peer review remains the gold standard for 
many research communities (Wilsdon et al., 2015).
Funding decisions are also subject to increasing external in‐
fluences (reviewed in Penfield, Baker, Scoble, & Wykes, 2014): 
pressures for societal relevance may alter panel perceptions of 
quality, and some researchers feel that institutional assessments 
like the “Research Excellence Framework” in the UK might use cri‐
teria that become ineffective surrogates for quality (Eyre‐Walker 
& Stoletzki, 2013). The underlying reasons for this are changes 
in what is viewed as good science. In many countries, excellent 
basic science is not on its own deemed sufficient for funding, and 
researchers are urged or even required to make a case for the di‐
rect relevance of their research to society (KNAW, 2018; OECD, 
2018; Penfield et al., 2014). In our view, across‐the‐board empha‐
sis on direct societal relevance is troubling: numerous historical 
examples highlight the serendipitous nature of scientific discov‐
ery as well as the fact that the translational impact of a particular 
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study often occurs well after the original discovery (Gravem et al., 
2017; Stephan, 2012). In addition, societal relevance can be used 
as a criterion for ad hoc funding decisions with a political rather 
than scientific basis (as, e.g., recently happened in Australia, see 
Nogrady, 2018). Nevertheless, there are also many positive ef‐
fects of heightened focus on societal relevance, which we discuss 
below. One problem, in any case, is that funding agencies might 
not be explicit enough about the criteria and values with which 
proposals are being judged.
The systemic challenges facing scientific funding prompted recent 
calls for shifts in science funding allocation practices, such as net‐
work (Bollen, Crandall, Junk, Ding, & Börner, 2014) or lottery (Fang & 
Cassadeval, 2016) approaches for the distribution of funding. Vaesen 
and Katzav (2017) even suggested that it might be best to distribute 
money equally amongst all scientists without competition. We here 
propose that useful insights might come from comparing existing 
funding schemes to identify especially positive and destructive ele‐
ments with respect to maintaining scientific quality and promoting ef‐
ficient and positively motivated scientific communities. With this goal 
in mind, we leverage the substantial variation that already exists in 
science funding for evolutionary biology across countries to initiate 
a constructive, forward‐looking discussion about how funding strat‐
egy influences scientific quality in this field. Whereas a comprehensive 
across‐country comparison might be very difficult to achieve, even im‐
perfect “partial” comparisons can provide important insights into the 
consequences of particular funding strategies (OECD, 2018; see also 
Laudel, 2006 and Whitley et al., 2018 for good examples).
We believe that our approach can highlight effective funding 
schemes and may help evolutionary biologists to identify their own 
“optimal niche” for funding success. Our discussions were initi‐
ated through a workshop at the European Society for Evolutionary 
Biology conference in 2017 that was organized by S.M. and M.N. 
Even though our focus is on evolutionary biology, we believe that 
many of our conclusions are likely to be generalizable, at least to 
some extent, to other scientific fields.
2  | VARIATION ACROSS FUNDING 
AGENCIES AND HOW THIS VARIATION 
AFFEC TS SCIENCE
We draw on our expertise as evolutionary biologists who collectively 
work in multiple countries to provide an initial sample of current prac‐
tice in countries that foster major endeavours in evolutionary biology. 
We compare national funding schemes for evolutionary biology in 
ten different countries (see Table 1 for details). We also include the 
European Research Council (ERC), which is one major strand of the 
European Union's overall science funding (currently Horizon 2020). 
The ERC explicitly funds bottom‐up basic science and has emerged as 
an important funding scheme for many European evolutionary biolo‐
gists. While some of us have experience on review panels or in other 
capacities for the surveyed agencies, it is important to emphasize that 
the information and views reported here are our personal impressions, 
compiled in late 2017 and early 2018. We also include information on 
newer funding schemes by the Dutch funding agency NWO, follow‐
ing the implementation of major changes in summer 2018. We focus 
our assessments and comments on 14 elements grouped into four 
categories: (a) topical shaping of science, (b) distribution of funds, (c) 
application and review procedures, and (d) incentives for mobility and 
diversity.
Our survey reveals some striking similarities and differences 
across the 11 funding agencies with respect to allocation of funding 
TA B L E  1   Details of reviewed funding agencies. All details have been assessed in late 2017/early 2018; additional newer schemes 
indicated as well for the Netherlands. All details expressed are personal views
Country Statements in Tables 2‒5 refer to
Australia The Australian Research Council (ARC), the main governmental funding body for research; some of the statements are based 
on Discovery Projects, the ARC's main funding instrument for nonapplied research
Canada Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), Canada's federal funding agency; some of the state‐
ments are based on Discovery Grants
ERC Mainly to the Starting, Consolidator and Advanced grant schemes of the European Research Council (ERC)
France French National Research Agency (ANR), the main governmental funding body for research
Germany Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DGF); more specifically, some of the statements are based on individual project grants 
(“Sachbeihilfe”)
Netherlands ALW programme of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) until May 2018; since August 2018 new ENW 
programme (indicated where these programs differ)
Portugal Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT)
Sweden Swedish Research Council's board for Science and Engineering and the yearly announcement of project grants.
Switzerland Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the main governmental funding body for research. Some of the statements are 
based on Project Grants within Biology and Medicine
UK Natural Environment Research Council, primarily to their “Discovery grants” and “individual fellowship” schemes. The 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council operates a similar, but not identical system
United States US National Science Foundation (NSF) and the US National Institutes of Health (NIH)
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for evolutionary biology research (Tables 2‒5). Below, we provide 
our perspective on how the 14 different elements that were our 
focus affect scientific quality. While not all authors agree regarding 
all the details or even the overall thrust of each recommendation, 
the absence of unanimity is not surprising given that “scientific qual‐
ity” is not an objectively measurable quantity on any single scale. 
Nevertheless, we hope that our discussion can inspire a constructive 
debate amongst both researchers and funding agencies on import‐
ant issues surrounding mechanisms of science funding allocation, 
scientific quality and the health of the scientific community (see here 
also Cousens, 2019).
3  | TOPIC AL SHAPING OF SCIENCE
3.1 | Emphasis on societal relevance and broader 
impacts
Some of the national funding agencies that we review prefer, or 
even require, that basic science projects have societal relevance 
(e.g., Australia, Canada, France, Portugal, UK, United States, the 
Netherlands; Table 2). Our survey suggests that the way in which 
societal relevance is implemented differs across funding agencies 
(see also OECD, 2018). For example, some countries (e.g., UK, United 
States) merely require some form of representation or translation 
of basic science to the public and/or policy arenas, whereas other 
countries have a more direct requirement for science with a soci‐
etal value, often to the potential detriment of basic science (e.g., 
Portugal, France, the Netherlands). By contrast, there is no specific 
requirement for the inclusion of societal impact for national funding 
agencies in Switzerland, Germany, Sweden or in the ERC. Indeed, 
part of the motivation underlying the establishment of the ERC 
was as a counter to the increasing emphasis on societal relevance 
in other EU funding instruments (currently Horizon 2020, see also 
Nowotny, 2006).
Whether the strategy of explicitly requiring societal relevance 
leads to better (broadly conceived) science is an open question. 
In general, it is very difficult to measure broader impact (KNAW, 
2018; LERU, 2018; Penfield et al., 2014; Wilsdon et al., 2015). Not 
surprisingly, we as a group are somewhat divided regarding this 
issue. In the best case scenario, a societal relevance requirement 
would improve scientific and societal progress (Rinze & Miedema, 
2016). In particular, encouraging scientists to take a broader view 
of values that include societal impacts might liberate them from 
the potentially harmful yet sometimes still entrenched stance that 
TA B L E  2   Assessment of elements regarding the topical shaping of science across funding agencies
Country
Emphasis on societal relevance/broader 
impacts?
Investment in bottom‐up 
blue‐sky research vs. top‐down 
funding programmes
Integration of funding programmes for basic and 
applied science/science with societal relevance?
Australia Yes Mostly bottom‐up Same funding agency but different instruments; 
societal relevance also important for basic sci‐
ence projects
Canada Yes Mostly bottom‐up Yes
ERC No: Emphasis on scientific excellence 
but societal relevance is considered
Exclusively bottom‐up Yes: Main schemes fund basic research but supple‐
mentary schemes are available to develop impact
France Yes: Projects focusing on 9 major soci‐
etal challenges (50% of funding)
Half bottom‐up/half top‐down Yes: Same funding agency, some calls offer pos‐
sibility to integrate both types of projects
Germany No: Emphasis on basic research, but 
follow‐up “transfer” funding with non‐
academic partners possible
Mostly bottom‐up; ~7% of DFG 
funding goes into top‐down 
“Priority programmes”
Same funding agency but different instruments, 
for example clinical trial grants
Netherlands Yes: Societal relevance 20% of the total 
score (ALW); this has recently changed 
to impact and risen to 30% in some 
calls (ENW)
Bottom‐up; some specific calls; 
consortia often have specific 
constraints
Yes: Societal relevance and/or impact impor‐
tant. ENW: Some consortia require industrial 
or societal partners who co‐fund the project; 
consortia topics can be informed by societal/
economic relevance (Top sectors; Dutch national 
research agenda)
Portugal Yes: Very important Bottom‐up Yes: same funding agency, same scheme
Sweden No: Only scientific value is considered. All bottom‐up; but also some 
specific calls
No: There are other governmental funding bodies 
that announce grants with societal relevance
Switzerland No: Emphasis on high‐quality basic 
research
Mostly bottom‐up No: Basic research funded by SNF, applied science 
funded by KTI, which is done at technical colleges
UK Yes: Societal impact is considered in all 
funding schemes, including “Discovery 
grants” (funding route for basic science)
1/3rd bottom‐up; also some 
scientific community input to 
strategic research programmes
Yes: All schemes require some contribution to 
societal impact; the extent of the contribution 
required varies among schemes
United 
States
Yes: Broader impacts required for NSF; 
NIH grants relevant to human health
Mostly bottom‐up Same funding agency, increasing emphasis on 
funding for broader impacts activities within 
basic science grants at NSF.
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science is best conducted in a cultural, social and historical vacuum. 
Good examples of where evolutionary biology can have policy im‐
plications and thus usefully addresses “science in society” come 
from research programmes directed at understanding how anthro‐
pogenic influences affect natural population dynamics and evo‐
lution in urban settings (Alberti, Marzluff, & Hunt, 2017; Alberti, 
Correa, et al., 2017), in response to climate change, hunting, ag‐
riculture, pollution, or antibiotics (Hendry, Gotanda, & Svensson, 
2017) or integrating evolutionary understanding of underlying pro‐
cesses with ecological monitoring of biodiversity loss (Brodersen & 
Seehausen, 2014).
On the flip side, scientific quality might suffer from an increased 
focus on societal relevance if researchers abandon the most important 
questions or problems in an effort to address short‐term issues that 
fit current policies or agendas (KNAW, 2018). Often, these projects 
or calls for proposals focus on delivering economic or technological 
pay‐offs (Gibson & Hazelkorn, 2017) and seem motivated by the need 
to account for taxpayer contributions to national science funding. 
A related but distinct problem is that the extreme competition that 
characterizes many grant programmes might incentivize researchers 
to exaggerate potential societal benefits (so‐called “grant‐speak”). In 
our view, this latter issue is especially likely in situations where funding 
TA B L E  3   Assessment of elements regarding the distribution of funds across eleven funding agencies
Country Allocation of money
Consortia vs. personal 
stipends
Long‐ vs. 
short‐term
Flexibility of 
funding schemes Funding rates, and who can apply?
Australia Mostly intermediate 
(~400 k$), but also a 
few large grants
Project grants predomi‐
nate; teams with >1 
applicants normal
3–5 years 
for 
research 
projects
Flexible (budget 
between $30 k 
and $500 k per 
year)
Funding rate: ~18% (Discovery 
Projects); all employees of Australian 
Universities can apply, and there can 
be international partner investigators. 
Max of two grants per person
Canada Small amounts (35 k$ 
typical), many 
awardees
Personal stipends 5 years Flexible Funding rate: 70%–75%. Only Prof. or 
Adjunct Prof. can apply
ERC Large (1.5–2.5 M€) Mostly individual‐led 
projects; synergy grants 
for cross‐disciplinary 
teams
5 years Flexible, but am‐
bitious projects 
expected
Funding rate: ~10%. Restrictions on 
working time since PhD (Starting and 
Consolidator). Applicants must have a 
base in a suitable EU institution.
France Intermediate to large 
(200–900 k€)
Consortia grants 
predominate; 75% col‐
laborative projects
2–4 years Flexible Funding rate: 10%–15%. Permanent 
researchers at University/Research 
Center can apply
Germany Intermediate 
(~230 k€); larger 
grants for consortia 
etc.
Project grants with single 
applicant predominate
≦3 years 
for 
research 
projects
Flexible Funding rate: 36% (Individual research 
projects). Researchers holding a PhD 
at all German research institutions 
can apply
Netherlands ALW: intermediate; 
ENW: various types, 
from small to large 
(160 k€–3 M€), some 
even bigger grants
ALW: Personal grant to PI 
ENW: Personal grant 
to PI, personal grant 
with co‐PI or large 
(consortium)
ALW: 
4 years
ALW: Quite fixed 
ENW: relatively 
flexible for big‐
ger ones
Funding rate ~10% (data for ALW; no 
data yet for ENW). Permanent faculty 
can apply, tenure‐track PIs with decla‐
ration that the applicant will be hired 
for project duration
Portugal Intermediate (up to 
200 k€)
Both. Not clear which is 
preferred
3 years Quite fixed; 
budget 
justifications
Funding rate between 5% and 8%. 
Anyone with a PhD is allowed to apply
Sweden Intermediate (400 k€) 
and many awardees
Project grants to main 
applicant
4 years Very flexible Funding rate 20%. Staff affiliated to 
Swedish university at least 20% of 
their time can apply
Switzerland Intermediate: regular 
grants (~500 kCHF); 
also some larger 
grants
Project grants predomi‐
nate, single applicant 
preferred
1–4 years 
for 
research 
projects
Flexible (budget 
of at least 
50 kCHF)
Funding rate: 43% (Project grants in 
Biology & Medicine). Researchers 
≥4 years post‐PhD. Only one applica‐
tion per round, up to two in total
UK Intermediate: 65‐
800 k£; also large 
grants
Project grants pre‐
dominate, often teams. 
Fellowships also 
available.
3 years for 
projects, 
5 for 
fellowships
Flexible, but 
detailed cost 
justification 
required
Funding rate: ~20%. Only researchers 
with contracts extending beyond the 
grant period may apply. Institutional 
application quotas apply
United 
States
Intermediate (~100–
250 k$); also some 
smaller and bigger 
grants
Project grants predomi‐
nate, teams with >1 ap‐
plicants are common
Typically 
2–5 years
Somewhat 
flexible; NSF 
requires budget 
justification
Funding rate: <10%–25%. Who can 
apply is dependent on the grant (often 
PI status needed, some to post‐docs 
and graduate students)
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outcomes directly depend on the perceived societal relevance of the 
expected short‐term project results. It would thus be a distinct im‐
provement if grant proposal evaluations focused less on expected 
project outcomes and more on project design. Such focus on meth‐
ods, or “pathways to impact” (KNAW, 2018; LERU, 2018), can, for ex‐
ample, include evaluation components that address whether projects 
involve stakeholders or include real‐world input such as field research 
(wherever appropriate). In our view, funding agencies should ideally 
also maintain substantial funding for basic research per se.
3.2 | Investment in top‐down funding programmes 
versus bottom‐up blue‐sky research
National funding agencies typically offer both bottom‐up and top‐
down funding programmes, but our survey suggests that there is 
variation across these agencies in the proportion of investment in 
each type of programme. Top‐down funding streams are directed 
towards specific goals and purposes, often with a societal, techno‐
logical or economic focus (see also section above). Our overview 
(Table 2) suggests that the UK has the largest share of such top‐down 
programmes for evolutionary biologists, around two‐thirds of the 
funding programmes that support evolutionary biology in the UK. 
Such relatively heavy investment in top‐down funding is also linked 
to the fact that some new UK funding streams are now available in 
the specific context of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
fund. Around half of France's funding programmes for evolutionary 
biology are invested in a top‐down context. The other funding agen‐
cies primarily offer mostly (or only, ERC) bottom‐up blue‐sky fund‐
ing for evolutionary biology, though funding in the Netherlands can 
also come with specific constraints and/or in a top‐down context.
TA B L E  4   Assessment of elements regarding the application and review procedures across funding agencies
Country Who/what is being judged
Administrative burden/length of 
proposals Who is reviewing?
Existence of inter‐
views and rebuttals
Australia Main scheme: 40% project quality, 35% 
investigators, 10% feasibility, 15% 
benefit
High burden: In total, an applica‐
tion >50 pages, often several 
investigators
Panel of experts, 
external reviewers
Rebuttals
Canada Excellence of candidate, proposal qual‐
ity, Highly Qualified Personnel Training
Intermediate burden: 5 pages or re‐
search proposal plus budget, HQP 
training and CV
Panel of experts, 
external reviewers
No rebuttal, no 
interview
ERC Project and investigator; over‐riding 
criterion is scientific excellence
High burden: Round 1 (5‐page 
proposal + CV, track record) and 
Round 2 (20‐page proposal, budget 
proposals) submitted together
Round 1: Panel, 
round 2: panel and 
external reviewers
No rebuttals, inter‐
view at Starter or 
Consolidator level
France Quality and originality of project, 
quality and expertise of consortium, 
adequacy of budget, impact and diffu‐
sion strategy
High burden: Round 1 = project of 4 
pages and CVs. Round 2 = project 
of 20 pages and CVs
Panel of experts, 
external reviewers
Rebuttals since 2016, 
no interview
Germany Scientific quality, applicants’ qualifica‐
tions, objectives and work programme, 
employment opportunities, planned 
allocation of funding
Intermediate burden: 20 pages 
maximum for research proposal, 
plus CV
Panel of experts, 
external reviewers
No rebuttals/inter‐
views for project 
grants
Netherlands Originality of proposal, scientific quality 
(proposal and team), societal relevance 
and/or impact 
ALW: Relatively low burden: total 
proposal 12 pages; ENW: around 8 
pages for research proposal
Panel of experts, 
external reviewers
2‐page rebuttal. 
Some schemes: 
interviews
Portugal Project, team and investigator High burden Panel and external 
reviewers
Rebuttals; no 
interview
Sweden Novelty and originality, scientific quality 
and merits of main applicant.
Low burden: Project description max 
10 pages. Budget uses a template. 
Reuse of CV in system
Panel of experts None
Switzerland Track record, scientific quality and 
feasibility
Intermediate burden: Research plan 
20 pages, CV = 2 pages, list of 
achievements = 2 pages
Panel of experts, 
external reviewers
None for project 
grants. Fellowships: 
Interviews
UK Scientific quality of the project is main 
criterion; also investigator track re‐
cords, risk‐reward balance and impact
Intermediate burden: 8‐page 
proposal plus budget, CVs, Impact 
statement and forms. Internal vet‐
ting before submission adds burden
Panel of experts, 
input from exter‐
nal reviewers
Rebuttals consid‐
ered, interview for 
fellowships
United 
States
Scientific quality, applicant qualifica‐
tions, diversity, impact, programme 
portfolio
High burden: 12‐ to 15‐page project 
description along with many sup‐
plementary documents
Panel + reviewers 
(NSF); NIH: Panel
None
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Whereas top‐down research funding streams are typically directed 
to the most pressing needs of a specific society, a top‐down focus also 
increases the likelihood that researchers are faced with a relatively 
narrow set of perspectives and possibilities. By contrast, in a blue‐sky 
system, researchers can freely choose topics and methods. Whereas 
this latter approach might be viewed as risky, the typical top‐down 
pathway of following current trends and hypes can prove suboptimal: 
“big ideas” can fail to deliver what they promised, generating substan‐
tial long‐term risks via heavy investment in an ultimate failure (Joyner, 
Paneth, & Ioannidis, 2016). There also exists the substantial concern 
that (too) many researchers working on the same topic might promote 
incremental thinking while decreasing the likelihood of breakthroughs 
in unexpected directions (Geman & Geman, 2016). We believe that 
it is thus especially important to preserve and even increase invest‐
ment in bottom‐up “blue‐sky” funding schemes because, in our view, 
these strategies provide a funding mechanism that is more likely to 
be associated with high‐quality research and that could also provide 
substantial societal benefits via connections to relevant stakeholders. 
Indeed, this could be tested: a recent bibliometric study demonstrated 
that breakthrough‐type (“disruptive”) research has not typically been 
the type of research that had been funded by the US NSF (Wu, Wang, 
& Evans, 2019). It would be interesting to investigate whether, for ex‐
ample, the ERC as an entirely bottom‐up funding scheme does deliver 
this type of science.
3.3 | Integration of funding programmes for 
basic and applied science and science with 
societal relevance
Funding agencies in some countries score grant proposals by inte‐
grating separate scores for basic and applied components of the pro‐
posed research (e.g., United States, the Netherlands), whereas others 
evaluate applied and basic aspects together (Portugal, Australia; 
see also Table 2). A different model is provided by countries in 
which basic and applied research proposals form separate funding 
streams, handled by different funding agencies (e.g., in Switzerland) 
or committees (e.g., Discovery grants versus Strategies grants in 
the Canadian NSERC; Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet) 
versus the Swedish Research Council for Environment, Agricultural 
Sciences and Spatial Planning (Formas); Societal challenge axes 
versus fundamental axes in the French ANR). The ERC funds basic 
research, but offers supplementary schemes for subsequent devel‐
opment of societal–technological impact.
These different approaches can have major consequences for 
the types of projects that are funded. In theory, funding agencies or 
programmes that handle both basic and applied science can enable 
projects to bridge the basic‐applied divide. In practice, this scenario 
can lead to a situation where basic and applied science proposals 
are placed in direct competition, often to the detriment of funda‐
mental science. Such competition is reduced when separate funding 
schemes are used for basic and applied science, though this separa‐
tion might generate new challenges. First, specific types of funding 
might become tied to certain institutions, making it difficult for re‐
searchers from other institutions to obtain this type of funding even 
if their research is applicable. Second, there is the top‐down issue of 
how much money flows into each pot. In our view, funding agencies 
should provide some funding dedicated to basic science because this 
strategy can ensure that basic science always receives support. This 
reasoning also takes into consideration that applied science projects 
are more likely to be suitable for funding or co‐funding sources that 
exist outside of national funding agencies, such as private sector 
end‐users.
TA B L E  5   Assessment of elements regarding incentives for 
mobility and diversity across funding agencies
Country Mobility
Focus on diversity, equal 
opportunities
Australia Not 
emphasized
Accounted for to some extent 
through “performance relative 
to opportunity” assessment
Canada Not 
emphasized
Explicit focus on equal 
opportunities
ERC Emphasized at 
Starting Grant 
level
Explicit focus on equal 
opportunities
France Not 
emphasized
No specific focus on equal 
opportunities
Germany Emphasized 
only for 
post‐docs
To some extent: Diversity 
and equal opportunity are 
recognized as important; 
special benefits for fellowship 
recipients with children
Netherlands Emphasized 
only for 
post‐docs
Not focused upon in ALW‐
scheme, but women prioritized 
in ENW scheme. For excel‐
lence schemes: extensions for 
eligibility period for parenthood 
after doctorate (18 months of 
standard extension per birth for 
women, up to 3 children; also 
extension for documented care‐
taking time for fathers); special 
NWO grants for women outside 
of ALW/ENW
Portugal Emphasized for 
fellowships
No focus on equal opportunities
Sweden Emphasized 
only for 
post‐docs
Explicit focus on equal 
opportunities
Switzerland Emphasized 
only for 
post‐docs
Special grant for female re‐
searchers with family‐related 
career interruptions; exten‐
sions of eligibility periods for 
excellence scheme (Ambizione) 
in case of maternity after 
doctorate (18 months per child 
or longer if documented)
UK Emphasized for 
fellowships
Explicit focus on equal 
opportunities
United 
States
Not 
emphasized
Explicit focus on equal 
opportunities
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4  | DISTRIBUTIONS OF FUNDS
4.1 | Allocation of money: Large versus small grants
How money allocated to research grants is distributed differs sub‐
stantially across the funding agencies. Our survey suggests that 
Canada provides low levels of funding per grant relative to the inter‐
mediate‐level grants typical of other countries in our survey and the 
relatively large grants provided by the ERC and recently, the Dutch 
NWO (see Table 3). We also find that grant sizes vary within funding 
agencies.
In principle, relatively large grants might be preferable in situa‐
tions where the technology required to achieve particular desired 
outcomes is very expensive or when a few researchers do such an 
outstanding job (judged by past performance) that exceptional re‐
sults are also expected for future work. The latter argument stands 
on shaky ground; however, more funding does not necessarily imply 
higher scientific output—or at least not to the degree expected 
(Fortin & Currie, 2013). In our view, the only argument for high in‐
vestment in a few projects that seems to withstand scrutiny is that 
breakthrough research might require a great deal of financial in‐
vestment. Scientific breakthroughs often occur via outside‐the‐box 
thinking, which can be enhanced when a diverse team of research‐
ers works together to solve a specific scientific question or problem 
(Bammer, 2017; Bromham, Dinnage, & Hua, 2016). For this reason, 
the funding strategies directed towards so‐called excellence centres 
often involve relatively large pots of money that are granted over 
substantial periods of time (Bloch & Sørensen, 2015).
On the other hand, we believe that there are several objective 
reasons to favour a more egalitarian distribution of grant funding. In 
particular, truly “breakthrough” research is very rare and still needs a 
foundation provided by “normal” research projects. It is also reason‐
able to consider that a more egalitarian distribution of resources might 
translate into a happier scientific community that might in turn pro‐
duce better science and reduce the incidence of fraud (Moore et al., 
2017). The “happiness” point finds indirect support from research on 
the determinants of societal happiness, which indicates that the lack 
of fundamental resources or rights can generate marked unhappiness. 
With respect to fraud, resource scarcity has been implicated as con‐
tributing to the incentivization of fraudulent fabrication or omission of 
data, result enhancement, idea stealing and monopolization of critical 
resources (at least in the United States; Anderson, Ronning, De Vries, 
& Martinson, 2007). On the other hand, because administrative bur‐
den might scale at least in part with the number of funded grants, a 
major increase in the funding rate associated with a decreased alloca‐
tion of money per grant does not come entirely cost‐free. Overall, we 
believe that a targeted funding strategy that allocates most funds to‐
wards a broad base (i.e., smaller individual awards) but also includes a 
few larger awards (for large interdisciplinary projects and/or centres of 
excellence) might be the best way to increase overall systemic quality. 
Relatively large project funding is typically awarded to relatively large 
teams (consortia or centres) rather than individuals (though there are 
exceptions, e.g., ERC grants).
4.2 | Consortia versus individual‐led projects
Some funding agencies include schemes that give money to rela‐
tively large teams of researchers (so‐called “consortia”; see also 
Bloch & Sørensen, 2015). Consortium‐based approaches are fun‐
damentally different from individual‐led projects, where funding 
is primarily awarded to individual researchers with excellent ideas 
and/or with a track record of excellence. Such a separation between 
funding strategies for consortia and individuals does not mean that 
a funding agency cannot support both types of project (e.g., Horizon 
2020).
Our overview suggests that consortia‐based funding schemes are 
relatively rare in evolutionary biology. France is an exception, where 
75% of grants are awarded to consortia. Relatively large consortia 
grants are also awarded in the Netherlands and in some UK schemes. 
Whereas several of the other countries provide grants to more than 
one PI (Portugal, Australia, United States; Table 3), none of these coun‐
tries typically offer funding schemes that focus on large‐scale consor‐
tia. Several countries do provide funding for “centres of excellence” or 
larger network schemes (e.g., Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden 
and Finland), which can include evolutionary biology.
Individual‐led programmes, which provide the largest share of grant 
types in our overview, can be objectively split into two different catego‐
ries. First, for so‐called “project grants,” funding is given to established 
researchers whose baseline salary is often covered by their employing 
institution but can sometimes also be partly cost recovered in the grant. 
These grants typically include funding for junior researchers (i.e., post‐
doctoral researchers and/or PhD students). The other type of individ‐
ual‐led programs, offered by several countries in our survey, provides 
personal research fellowships. These awards tend to be allocated to rel‐
atively recent PhD recipients (e.g., Switzerland, Germany, UK). Australia 
and the Netherlands offer three different fellowship schemes, for inde‐
pendent junior, mid‐career and senior researchers.
Both large team and individual‐led projects offer advantages and 
disadvantages. On one hand, consortia and centres can yield benefits 
by integrating a variety of perspectives (Bammer, 2017; Ledford, 2015). 
These groups also typically consist of established scientists who are rel‐
atively likely to produce high‐quality science (Bloch & Sørensen, 2015). 
On the other hand, larger groups can also stifle creativity and tend to‐
wards conservatism (Geman & Geman, 2016), and may actually waste 
resources if scientifically unnecessary partners are included solely to 
fulfil funding criteria. The flexibility and freedom of choice and methods 
that characterize relatively small‐scale projects can produce surprising 
scientific outcomes that are not likely to be generated by consortia or 
other large groups (Wu et al., 2019). By this logic, we believe that maxi‐
mizing scientific quality will include a balanced investment in both indi‐
vidual projects and group‐led efforts (see also Wu et al., 2019).
4.3 | Long‐term versus short‐term projects
Our survey shows that funding is most often associated with 2‐ to 
4‐year projects, with the exception of fellowships (see Table 3; see 
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also OECD, 2018: clustering found around 3‐ to 5‐year funding). In 
many countries, grant duration is likely tied to the duration of typical 
PhD and post‐doc positions, which can vary widely across countries. 
There are relatively few funding agencies and schemes that support 
longer‐term projects (e.g., NSERC [Canada], ERC, some NSF funding 
schemes, “centres of excellence”).
How does the typical focus on relatively short time scales in‐
fluence scientific quality? In our own field of evolutionary biology, 
it is impossible to generate robust insights into many fundamental 
questions (e.g., natural temporal fluctuations in selection) within 
short time frames (Clutton‐Brock & Sheldon, 2010). Indeed, the 
longest running field studies in evolutionary ecology are some of 
the most productive (Clutton‐Brock & Sheldon, 2010; in particu‐
lar their box 3), and there is a growing consensus that long‐term 
research in ecology and evolution offers unique and important 
insights (Hughes et al., 2017; Kuebbing et al., 2018). Despite the 
clear value of long‐term studies, there is a real concern that fund‐
ing schemes will push biological research away from long‐term 
field‐based work in natural populations towards laboratory‐based 
research with model organisms, simply because the time frame 
and feasibility of laboratory‐based research provides a better fit to 
current funding schemes (see also Kuebbing et al., 2018; Neiman, 
Meirmans, Schwander, & Meirmans, 2018). Clearly, funding strat‐
egies need to support both types of research, ideally working 
together.
We believe that the documented productivity and quality of 
long‐term research projects should counter the viewpoint that this 
type of project is “too risky” in drawing resources for a long period 
of time without producing tangible benefits. For this reason, we sug‐
gest a stronger emphasis on more long‐term funding as implemented 
by some funding agencies (see also Alberts et al., 2014). Even so, we 
recognize the challenges associated with using a finite pot of money 
to manage the trade‐off of providing long‐term projects with guaran‐
teed funding while simultaneously encouraging diversity in research 
groups, including support for small and recently established (or to 
be established) research teams. Monitoring long‐term research and/
or developing a low‐burden application process for continuation of 
especially promising and already funded projects (e.g., Switzerland) 
seems, in our opinion, to constitute a move in the right direction.
4.4 | Flexibility of funding schemes
Most funding agencies show some flexibility at least in principle re‐
garding project duration and budget (Table 3). However, in our ex‐
perience the reality can also be that scientists may need to show 
sufficient ambition, meaning that the maximum funding possible 
needs to be requested for in order to be assessed at all (e.g., the 
Dutch excellence schemes). Good arguments can probably be made 
for inflexible approaches and particularly from the managerial per‐
spective of funding agencies. Nevertheless, we believe that existing 
flexibility should be enhanced by allowing each funding scheme to 
be tailored to the actual needs of any specific project—be it budget, 
duration or other aspects. For example, whereas some projects 
could be reasonably well equipped with relatively little money 
(e.g., modelling, meta‐analysis, reviews), other projects will need 
larger sums of money and/or time just to get started (money: pro‐
jects using genomics; time: e.g., studies on senescence, Monaghan, 
Charmantier, Nussey, & Ricklefs, 2008). Thus, it seems that more 
flexibility could substantially boost both quality and relevance of the 
funded research.
4.5 | Funding rates and who can apply
Our survey shows that funding rates for evolutionary biology re‐
search vary dramatically within and across countries, ranging from 
5% to 75% (Table 3; see also OECD, 2018). This variation in funding 
rate is especially interesting from the perspective of the idea of a 
“tipping point”: funding rates lower than 25%–30% might drive the 
system towards a “distress” state (Edwards & Roy, 2017; see intro‐
ductory text), suggesting that distress might characterize several of 
the countries that we surveyed.
Our survey also highlights mechanisms underlying high funding 
rates in certain countries or schemes, and in particular points to the 
roles of different demand management schemes: in essence, policies 
that restrict applications increase funding rates. Thus, we suggest 
that, if properly applied, demand management schemes might de‐
crease the risk of the “distress state.” Accordingly, in our opinion, 
funding agencies should carefully consider the application of some 
variant of these schemes. For example, several countries restrict 
applications to researchers with permanent positions (in addition, 
whereas these types of grants cover costs for PhD students and ma‐
terials, they do not cover the applicant's salary, and personnel costs 
typically translate into a relatively high cost for a given proposal). 
Another possibility is demonstrated by agencies like the Swiss SNSF 
that do not allow researchers to hold more than one grant on similar 
topics. Yet another potentially useful mechanism to manage demand 
is provided by agencies that limit researchers to a certain number 
of applications to a particular funding scheme (e.g., Veni and Vidi 
grants in the Netherlands, though funding rates still remain very low 
for these grants).
In the UK, the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) 
sets university‐level quotas for applications that are based on the 
previous number and success of applications: only those univer‐
sities that have already produced excellent work can submit rela‐
tively high numbers of applications. Although this quota strategy 
maintains the NERC funding rate at a higher level (~20%) than it 
would otherwise be, the imposition of a quota produces an earlier 
within‐university selection process. We as a group have mixed ex‐
perience with such quotas: on the one hand, they can seem unfair 
to an individual, but on the other hand, quotas can promote col‐
legiality in the application process and more effective prescreen‐
ing of proposals in a group. Indeed, quotas can reduce the tail of 
low‐quality proposals, including proposals submitted for the sole 
purpose of submission per se, a frequent outcome of the increas‐
ingly common requirement of proposal submission laid out in some 
university contracts.
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The ERC is unique in attempting to increase funding rates by set‐
ting the bar high at the proposal stage: only the most “excellent” re‐
searchers are encouraged to apply, and individual applicants whose 
proposals go unfunded are not allowed to reapply for up to two years 
if the proposal is deemed too far below the threshold for funding. A 
preproposal requirement (e.g., US NSF, though this requirement was 
recently dropped; French ANR) is another mechanism that can be 
applied to increase funding rates at the full proposal level. Whereas 
all of these demand management schemes have limitations, thought‐
ful application of such schemes does seem to have some promise for 
increasing funding rates in a way that minimizes wasted applicant 
and reviewer time.
One of the most obvious challenges associated with demand 
management schemes is the attendant risks of enhancing the 
“Matthew effect” (Merton, 1968), defined as a situation where re‐
searchers who are already successful receive, for each unit of work 
or “quality” they produce, more credit than relatively new or junior 
scientists. Demand management schemes might also decrease the 
likelihood that vulnerable researchers (minorities, women, individ‐
uals following alternative career pathways) will achieve funding 
success. This latter issue is particularly problematic with respect 
to, for example, the notable and thus‐far intractable gender gap 
in science (Holman, Stuart‐Fox, & Hauser, 2018). In our view, this 
issue could be ameliorated by earmarking funds for underrepre‐
sented and vulnerable groups (see section on diversity and equal 
opportunities below). One might also consider circumstances that 
affect performance scores. A good example of such consider‐
ation is provided by the Research Opportunity and Performance 
Evidence (ROPE) Statement incorporated in the Australian funding 
scheme. This statement allows researchers to explain career his‐
tories and opportunities, providing an opportunity to explain, for 
example, career breaks due to family obligations.
Finally, we believe that there should be limits imposed on the ri‐
gidity of management schemes. For example, management schemes 
that prevent resubmission (e.g., BBSRC in the UK) might ultimately 
reduce quality by generating barriers to revision and reconsideration 
of promising proposals.
5  | APPLIC ATION AND RE VIE W 
PROCEDURES
5.1 | Who/what is being judged?
Our overview shows that applications are judged similarly across our 
surveyed funding agencies (Table 3): all of the evaluation processes 
focus on both project and researcher/team quality, in accordance 
with the core missions of funding agencies (see also OECD, 2018). 
We also did find some across‐country differences in evaluation cri‐
teria, such as an added focus on societal relevance/ impact. Australia 
also applies specific weighting percentages across the different cri‐
teria for judging proposals. The US NSF has an additional focus on 
programme portfolio, meaning that this agency considers criteria 
that ensure the overall diversity of the research they support (e.g., 
balance across universities, geographic regions, disciplines and ap‐
proaches). In our view, the NSF portfolio approach thus likely ena‐
bles a good balance of support and minimizes the negative influence 
of (over)enthusiasm for research trends, with the cautionary note 
that portfolio definitions are themselves subject to trends and politi‐
cal influences.
We can consider the advantages and disadvantages of the ap‐
parent across‐country variation in proposal evaluation criteria and 
whether there could be better ways to structure the evaluation pro‐
cess. A focus on researcher quality might free scientists to focus on 
relatively risky projects, whereas emphasis on project quality could 
provide a foot in the door for researchers with a career gap, from 
alternative career pathways or from a different area of expertise. 
Team quality enhances project quality via complementary expertise 
but can also restrict funding to those researchers with well‐estab‐
lished scientific networks. We believe that it might be especially 
worthwhile to consider whether different criteria should be applied 
at different career stages or to different types of projects. For ex‐
ample, one could imagine a focus on researcher quality primarily for 
more established researchers in a permanent position, while giving 
preference to project quality for younger researchers on temporary 
contracts.
5.2 | Administrative burden/length of proposals
We found that grant proposals vary substantially across funding 
agencies in length and structure, the number (if any) and type of 
support letters that are required, and the extent of budgetary detail 
needed (see Table 4). Whereas such variation might seem mundane 
or unimportant compared to variation connected more obviously to 
science, such details can dramatically influence the amount of time 
and energy needed to write and submit a proposal, and the review 
process. Proposal structure will also have a major impact on the ad‐
ministrative burden imposed by submission and processing.
In principle, shorter and/or simpler proposals should impose 
a relatively light burden on scientists, reviewers and administra‐
tors, and we therefore strongly advocate changes in this direction. 
Shorter and simpler proposals will free up time and resources for 
science itself and might be relatively easy to achieve. Indeed, this 
logic is a major justification for the employment of preproposals by 
some funding agencies (e.g., until the last year by the US NSF). The 
extent to which preproposals reduce peer‐review burden remains 
unclear, however. For instance, the implementation of a preproposal 
requirement for French ANR grants in 2014 resulted in a >50% in‐
crease in grant applications. The ERC, on the other hand, requires 
simultaneous submission of long and short versions of the grant 
application, which seems to work well on the panel/reviewer side 
without generating very large numbers of preproposals. However, 
the ERC model does impose a substantial burden on applicants, who 
might invest substantial time in writing a proposal that goes unread 
and thus, yields no feedback. For this reason, we believe that a focus 
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on a single short and simple proposal is likely to constitute a sub‐
stantial improvement (around eight pages for the project descrip‐
tion). One could also consider whether it would be helpful to tailor 
grant length more specifically to the evaluations needed (see section 
above): when judging primarily for researcher quality (track record), 
the application could involve a long CV and a short project proposal, 
whereas project quality‐based grant programmes could require a rel‐
atively long project proposal and a short narrative CV that focuses 
more broadly on achievements.
5.3 | Who is reviewing?
Most of the eleven reviewed funding agencies use a combination 
of panel‐based reviews and/or external peer reviewers to evalu‐
ate proposals (Table 4). The two exceptions in our table are the 
US NIH and Sweden, which rely exclusively upon panel reviews. 
There is also variation in the extent that panel compositions use, 
or exclude, scientists who work in the country whose applicants 
are being judged.
How does variation in peer‐review strategy affect scientific 
quality? The standard view is that only external peer reviewers have 
the specialized knowledge needed to truly judge the quality of a 
grant application; grant review panel members do not necessarily 
possess specialized expertise for a particular proposal. There is also 
the distinct potential for a negative “inbreeding” effect (i.e., nepo‐
tism) that can result from panels comprised of reviewers from the 
same country. Extensive use of international peer review (or even an 
international review panel, e.g., Finland; see also OECD, 2018) is one 
way to minimize any potential effects of nepotism. This perspective 
thus implies that the sole use of internal panels for reviewing appli‐
cations is a less‐than‐optimal choice, at least if this panel is largely 
comprised of reviewers from that particular country. The reality is, 
however, that it is increasingly difficult to find enough senior ex‐
pert peer reviewers to review a growing proposal load, meaning that 
many such “experts” might in reality often be relatively junior scien‐
tists (see also Alberts et al., 2014). These junior scientists may lack 
sufficient breadth of experience of science and the funding context 
to evaluate diverse proposals; on the other hand, they also might 
invest more time and perhaps perform a more thorough review than 
more experienced scientists. There is also a reasonable concern 
that review confined to older experts might translate into narrow 
perspectives that discourage outside‐the‐box thinking. Both more 
junior scientists and panels might benefit from broader and more di‐
verse perspectives, including the possibility to discuss the proposals 
amongst panel members (see Lamont, 2009).
This is the basis for our conclusion that a combination of panel 
and external reviewers, as now used by most funding agencies, 
might indeed lead to the best and fairest possible outcomes. It is also 
important to reduce the impact of nepotism via international panels 
and peer reviewers–this consideration is likely the more important in 
relatively small countries with relatively few scientists. We do want 
to emphasize one important caveat: even within a panel, excellent 
but risky proposals or integrative/interdisciplinary proposals might 
have relatively low chances of success, at least if funding itself is 
rigidly focused on research feasibility or is structured into funding 
for specific research fields. Several studies have shown that whereas 
interdisciplinary projects are often encouraged in principle, they 
might be disadvantaged in practice because grant review itself has 
remained largely monodisciplinary (Bromham et al., 2016; Kwon, 
Solomon, Youtie, & Porter, 2017). Such an approach to review is 
likely to disproportionately affect interdisciplinary projects for sev‐
eral reasons, including the challenges inherent in convincing a nar‐
row review board that a proposal integrating across concepts and/or 
methods is interesting and feasible and that the researchers possess 
necessary expertise. An obvious fix is that the review process itself 
becomes more explicitly interdisciplinary (e.g., review across panels).
5.4 | Existence of interviews and rebuttals
There is considerable variation in whether funding agencies include 
interviews and/or rebuttals in their application process (Table 4). 
Rebuttals are short written responses by the applicant to the re‐
viewer assessments, enabling the researcher to clarify issues and 
explain misconceptions. In interviews, applicants can also do so; in 
addition, panel members are here given an opportunity to “sepa‐
rate the wheat from the chaff.” In particular, asking for more detail 
can flag grand‐sounding but ultimately weak application compo‐
nents. One real challenge posed by interviews is the potential for 
bias linked to researcher characteristics (e.g., gender, ethnicity) or 
personality (e.g., favouring more extroverted candidates). Either 
way, the addition of interview or rebuttal components increases 
the peer review and applicant preparation load. Interviews can 
also be costly if they require more time and travel; the latter also 
generates environmental impact that could perhaps be avoided.
Only a few funding agencies currently use rebuttals (e.g., 
Dutch NWO; NERC and BBSRC in the UK, French ANR, see also 
Table 4). We believe that a well‐executed rebuttal system provides 
a powerful means of applying proposal review in a manner that can 
increase the quality of funded research (in particular research de‐
sign). In our opinion, the positive features of rebuttals seem to out‐
weigh its negative effects, especially if the rebuttal is short (e.g., 
two pages in the Netherlands). In particular, rebuttals could be an 
important alternative in cases where interviews require relatively 
long travel periods. Rebuttals also allow more considered answers, 
which might permit the researchers to provide a higher‐quality re‐
sponse to reviewer critiques than an interview might deliver.
6  | INCENTIVES FOR MOBILIT Y AND 
DIVERSIT Y
6.1 | Mobility
Whereas some funding agencies provide fellowships that cannot 
be used in the home country (e.g., Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, 
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the Netherlands), thus favouring mobility, other funding agencies 
exclusively fund within‐country fellowships (United States, France, 
Australia; see Table 5). Appropriate mobility likely has positive ef‐
fects on scientific quality: breakthrough science is often associ‐
ated with transcendence of disciplinary or cultural horizons, both 
of which can be enhanced through international experience. By this 
logic, many might argue that scientific breakthroughs require novel 
interactions. Even with respect to the healthy progress of “normal” 
science (Kuhn, 1962), many scientists and science managers believe 
that young researchers should build their career in settings other 
than that of their PhD supervisor. Indeed, several recent studies de‐
tected a positive relationship between scientific quality and the mo‐
bility of scientists within a specific country (Adams, 2013; Sugimoto 
et al., 2017; Wagner & Jonkers, 2017). The take‐home message is 
that, from a scientific perspective, it thus seems very worthwhile to 
motivate mobility.
Despite these overall advantages, however, an emphasis on move‐
ment also poses challenges with respect to equity. Some individuals 
are more able to move, both physically and thematically, than others. 
A reluctance to move might have strong justifications—for example, 
a well‐established field project with a high likelihood of success as‐
sociated with continued investment, or a low likelihood of employ‐
ment for scientists with a working partner or family ties/dependants 
(e.g., school‐age children, elderly parents). Both could pose such chal‐
lenges to mobility that scientific quality might effectively decrease. 
We therefore suggest that some mobility funding structures should 
become more flexible, enabling a more individual account of the proj‐
ect and researcher in question. Alternatively, funding schemes could 
also support short‐term visits across research groups, providing in‐
centives for international collaborations per se (e.g., “mobility” credit 
for cross‐nationally multi‐authored articles), and even reconsider the 
notion that international collaboration for younger scholars and re‐
searchers necessarily needs to involve an extended tenure in a dif‐
ferent country.
6.2 | Diversity and equal opportunities
Some programmes or funding agencies explicitly incorporate strat‐
egies aimed at increasing diversity and the inclusion of particu‐
lar underrepresented groups (see Table 5). For example, there is a 
Discovery Indigenous programme in Australia, and some Swiss funds 
are reserved for eastern Europeans (PROMYS) and for female re‐
searchers (PRIMA). There are also funds earmarked for female re‐
searchers in the Netherlands (Aspasia, Athena). In the UK and at the 
EU level, there are funds dedicated to enabling re‐entry into science 
after a career break (Wellcome Trust's Research Career Re‐entry 
Fellowship; Marie Curie Reintegration Grant) as well as funds to 
facilitate managing both family and work (Dorothy Hodgkin fellow‐
ships). Several funding agencies also take parental leave into account 
when determining eligibility for particular funding programmes 
aimed at junior researchers (e.g., Netherlands, ERC, Norway) or pro‐
vide an opportunity to explain career development gaps in grant ap‐
plications (ROPE statement, Australia).
These examples of diversity and equity‐focused initiatives 
are still relatively scarce. We believe that a continued increase in 
explicit consideration for diversity and equality remains import‐
ant, especially in light of the multiple studies suggesting that the 
likelihood of breakthrough research increases when a research 
team harbours a diversity of researchers (Freeman & Huang, 2014; 
Powell, 2018). Importantly, such enhancement of the potential 
for breakthrough research only occurs for processes of true in‐
tegration of perspectives and not for “representational” diversity 
(Smith‐Doerr, Alegria, & Sacco, 2017). We thus believe that fund‐
ing agencies should increase their investment in funding support 
that is structured to maximize true integration of perspectives. 
The latter presupposes appropriate consideration for how details 
of research organization affect such integration (e.g., ensure that 
not all female researchers are junior researchers whereas male re‐
searchers are senior).
7  | SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BEST 
PR AC TICES
Evolutionary biology and other scientific disciplines face the posi‐
tive problem that there are more excellent researchers, with more 
excellent research ideas, than can be funded with available re‐
search resources. Because it seems unlikely that the available (na‐
tional/governmental) resources will increase radically and/or that 
the pool of eligible researchers will shrink drastically in the near 
future, the research community and associated funding agencies 
have the responsibility to find the “best” way of allocating limited 
resources to achieve the greatest returns in terms of generating 
excellent science and an effective, engaged and maximally pro‐
ductive scientific community. In this paper, we have presented 
a synthesis of a constructive and illuminating discussion and co‐
authorship process regarding which current elements of funding 
allocation might prove most useful. These discussions have in‐
volved researchers with different personal histories, methodologi‐
cal toolboxes, and countries of origin and employment. We hope 
that our contribution will inspire more research on how research‐
ers experience and view current funding policies. Ultimately, we 
need systematic and informed discussion regarding which values 
to emphasize and deemphasize. We can then use this information 
to guide decisions regarding allocation constraints and broader 
policies, with the ultimate goal of generating funding policies that 
makes sense to all parties involved.
Following this synthesis, we conclude with some recommen‐
dations for best funding practices that should foster scientific 
quality; we have linked these recommendations to the different el‐
ements of funding that we have scrutinized in our paper (Table 6). 
We realize that our comparative study of cross‐national funding 
schemes and their effect on science is limited by its largely sub‐
jective nature. We have reviewed what we, as a collective of evo‐
lutionary biologists, encounter when we apply for funding, and 
we have focused on eleven funding agencies with which we have 
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experience. We thus acknowledge that our review might not be 
easily extended to all fields or funding agencies. The inferences 
that we can make are also limited by the fact that we confined 
our review to funding agencies from Australia, North America and 
Europe; it would be very useful and interesting for a future anal‐
ysis to extend to a more diverse sample. Another relevant issue 
that we have not reviewed, but that deserves consideration, is the 
degree to which institutional (e.g., internal university) funding is 
available within and across countries.
Finally, we believe that it might be useful to consider whether 
science would actually benefit from potential optimization, and 
resulting standardization, of funding schemes across nations. One 
potential downside of this strategy is that at least some of the ex‐
isting diversity in funding schemes might be positive in providing a 
diversity of “niches” in a global “ecosystem” funding setting, allow‐
ing researchers to find their optimal niche (i.e., funding scheme). 
From this perspective, descriptions such as ours of cross‐nation 
variation in funding schemes might prove useful to individual re‐
searchers who have the mobility to move across countries. First 
and foremost, however, we hope that funders will make use of our 
comparative overview to critically evaluate and improve their fund‐
ing schemes.
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TA B L E  6   Recommendations for best practices with respect to maximizing scientific quality
Element of funding Recommended best practices
Societal relevance • Overt emphasis should be on research approach and design rather than project outcome
Top‐down vs. 
bottom‐up
• Fund bottom‐up research that also (when applicable) integrates science in society aspects
• Reduce top‐down constraints
Applied vs. basic • Set apart substantial explicit funding for basic science
Allocation of money • Mainly small amounts to many researchers
• Some larger funds to interdisciplinary groups (e.g., excellence centres)
Consortia vs. 
individual‐led
• Fund both consortia and individual‐led projects, which each confer specific and unique benefits
Long‐term vs. 
short‐term
• Fund more long‐term research
• Provide checkpoints and follow‐ups
Flexibility of funding 
schemes
• Increase flexibility in time, budget, team size with respect to best fit to the research vs. meeting inflexible 
standards
Acceptance rates and 
who applies
• Provide smart demand management schemes (e.g., limit no. of applications/researcher; size and type budget/re‐
searcher; etc.)
• These schemes should be field/domain‐specific
Who/what is being 
judged?
• Establish different categories: e.g., quality of project for younger researchers; quality of researcher for established 
researchers
Administrative burden • Reduce and simplify
• Tailor length of grant sections to evaluation type needed
Who is reviewing • Panel and external experts
• Invest in the quality of the experts and panel; reviewers from other countries in most smaller countries
Interviews/rebuttals • More rebuttals in general
Mobility • Encourage mobility when reasonable
• Emphasize flexibility, leaving the possibility to tailor to the individual needs of project/researcher
Diversity • Increase funds, and their diversity, for vulnerable groups
• Within projects, demands for diversity should fit the project rather than attempt to meet preset standards
• Within projects, take into account different hierarchy levels within an organization
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